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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 900214-CA

v.

i

Priority No. 2

RODNEY W. SMITH,

1

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of a

key prosecution witness's prior felony convictions under Rule 609
and Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence?
2.

Did the trial court err in excluding certain

hearsay testimony of a defense witness?
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated that "[w]hether
a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we
always review questions of law under a correctness standard."
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rodney W. Smith, was charged with theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 6). 1
Prior to the jury trial November 2, 1989, defense
counsel inquired of the trial court whether he could introduce
evidence of a prosecution witness's two prior convictions for
felony theft, as well as an apparent prior misdemeanor conviction
for falsification of a driver's license (Transcript of jury
selection, November 2, 1989 [hereinafter J.S.] at 63). The trial
court ruled that defense counsel would be allowed to inquire
concerning the criminal record of prosecution witness, Scott T.
Davidson (J.S. at 76). Specifically, the court ruled defense
counsel could "inquir[e] in front of the jury about the driver's
license matter and he can inquire about the burglary,2 for the
purpose of probing whether or not Mr. Davidson was a planner and
a leader on that" (J.S. at 76). Apparently, the trial court
based its ruling on both Rule 609 and Rule 404, Utah Rules of
Evidence (J.S. at 78). Subsequently, prior to Davidson
testifying, the trial court altered its previous ruling, deciding
that defense counsel could not inquire concerning the burglary
1

Defendant was originally charged with the additional
offense of receiving stolen property, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990) (R. at 6, 10). However, that charge was
subsequently dropped (R. at 30, 34).
2

The trial court apparently mispoke, referring to
Davidson's 1985 felony theft conviction as a burglary (J.S. at
76). Davidson characterized the conviction as a burglary in his
testimony before the court (J.S. at 72-73).
-2-

incident for the purpose of showing that Davidson was a "leader"
(Transcript of jury trial, November 2, 1989 [hereinafter T.] at
44-47).

The court further noted that he had nothing before him

which indicated that it would be appropriate for defense counsel
to bring out Davidson's felony convictions relating to
credibility (T. at 47).

The trial court's ruling allowing

inquiry concerning Davidson's conviction for falsification of a
driver's license remained unchanged (T. at 47). 3
Following the conclusion of the trial, November 2,
1989, defendant was convicted as charged (R. at 30). The trial
court subsequently sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah
State Prison of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years, which sentence was to run concurrently with the sentence
defendant was then serving.

Defendant received credit for time

served (R. at 59).
On November 13, 1989, defendant filed a motion for new
trial (R. at 64). The trial court denied defendant's motion in
part and took it under advisement in part on December 18, 1989
(R. at 77). The portion of the motion for new trial previously
taken under advisement was subsequently denied in an order filed
March 26, 1990 (R. at 84).

3

During the course of the trial, prior to defendant
testifying, the trial court similarly ruled that the prosecutor
would not be allowed to inquire concerning defendant's criminal
record "for essentially the same reason that I will not allow the
same thing with respect to Mr. Davidson, and this under Rule 609
of the recent rules by the Supreme Court" (T. at 95).
-3-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of August 17, 1989/ defendant, Rodney W.
Smith, and a friend, Scott E. Montoya, drove to Hot Water
Products (HWP)A in Midvale, Utah (Transcript of trial, November
2, 1989 [hereinafter T.] at 92, 97-100, testimony of Montoya; T.
at 114, testimony of defendant).

Observing no one on the

premises, the two men removed an approximately 7' square, preplumbed, Hawaiian style spa, worth approximately $1600 - $1900,
from a trailer inside the enclosed yard of HWP and loaded it into
their vehicle (T. at 31, 100, 115-116).
Having previously ascertained that a co-w.orker, Scott
T. Davidson, was interested in purchasing a hot tub, defendant
and Montoya drove to a pay phone in the vicinity of Murray High
School where defendant placed a call to Davidson informing him he
had a hot tub for sale (T. at 51-52, testimony of Davidson; 101,
testimony of Montoya; 116-117, testimony of defendant).

The two

men then delivered the spa to Davidson at his home in Murray (T.
at 51-52, testimony of Davidson; T. at 101, testimony of Montoya;
T. at 117, testimony of defendant).5
On the afternoon of August 18, 1989, Arthur Kessinger,
4

HWP is a wholesale distributor of bathtubs, spas,
chemicals and accessories (T. at 10).
5

Both defendant and Montoya testified that Davidson met
them at Murray High School and then directed them to his
(Davidson's) home (T. at 101, testimony of Montoya; 117,
testimony of defendant). Davidson, on the other hand, testified
that defendant called him at home between 5;00-6:30 p.m., and
told him he had a hot tub (T. at 51). When Davidson told
defendant that he would "like to take a look" at the hot tub,
defendant said he would bring it right over (T. at 52).
-4-

president of HWP, noticed that a spa was missing from a trailer
parked inside HWP's enclosed storage yard (T. at 32, 38), After
determining that the spa had not been sold, Kessinger reported
the theft to the Midvale Police Department (T. at 33, 41). When
HWP employees attempted to lock up that evening they discovered
that one of the chain links on the lock had been cut (T. at 14,
36).

One of the employees reported that the gate was unlocked

when he arrived for work that morning (T. at 13-14).

Kessinger

discovered part of the cut link as he was looking around the yard
after the theft had been discovered (T. at 14-15, 36).
Kessinger and his employees contacted several of their
competitors in the area to inform them of the stolen hot tub (T.
at 34). Subsequently, a local dealer called HWP and reported
that they had received a phone call from a person inquiring about
an equipment package and engine for a hot tub (T. at 34,
testimony of Kessinger; T. at 55, testimony of Davidson).
Apparently Davidson called several dealers inquiring about spa
equipment the day after defendant delivered the hot tub to his
home (T. at 55). An HWP employee, representing himself as a
service person, went to Davidson's home and verified that the hot
tub was the one reported missing from HWP (T. at 34, testimony of
Kessinger; T. at 55-56, testimony of Davidson).
Detective Scott Hodgkinson of the Midvale Police
Department assisted in the investigation of the stolen hot tub
(T. at 68). He interviewed Davidson on the evening of August 21,
1989, at which time Davidson said that defendant had approached
-5-

him about buying a hot tub for $500 on Thursday or Friday of the
previous week (T. at 72).
Detective Hodgkinson them talked to defendant the next
morning, August 22, 1989, when defendant arrived for work at
Weber Brother's Construction Company (T. at 73).

Defendant

initially denied involvement in the theft and refused to say more
until he talked to "somebody else" (T. at 74-75).

After

Detective Hodgkinson arrested defendant, defendant said, "Let's
go somewhere and talk" (T. at 75). Detective Hodgkinson
proceeded to the Salt Lake City Complex where defendant told him
that Davidson had asked him to pick up the hot tub (T. at 76).
When Detective Hodgkinson informed defendant that he did not
believe his story, defendant admitted that he had taken the hot
tub and that somebody else was with him, but he wouldn't say who
(T. at 76). Defendant further indicated that if Detective
Hodgkinson would let him drive away, he would tell the "entire
truth" (T. at 76-77).

When Detective Hodgkinson informed

defendant that he could not let him drive away, defendant said,
"That's fine.

Let's go to jail" (T. at 77).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The State concedes that the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence of key prosecution witness, Scott T.
Davidson's, prior felony convictions under Rule 609, Utah Rules
of Evidence which expressly provides for the admission of a
witness's prior felony convictions unless the probative value of
admitting the convictions outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
-6-

defendant.

The Utah rule is patterned after the federal rule

which similarly limits the admissibility of such evidence only
where it would prove unduly prejudicial to the defendant.
Moreover, the trial court's error was not harmless because
Davidson's testimony was the only evidence directly contradicting
defendant's testimony concerning the requisite element of intent.
Therefore, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the
error, the outcome would have been more favorable for defendant.
Thus, this case should be remanded for a new trial with direction
to the trial court that Davidson's felony convictions are
admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the scope of defense
counsel's inquiry concerning Davidson's prior convictions on
remand must be limited to the nature of the crime, the date of
the conviction and the punishment.

Although defendant asserts

generally that inquiry concerning the details of at least one of
the convictions is necessary to demonstrate Davidson's knowledge
pursuant to Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, he has not
established sufficient similarity or relation between the instant
theft and Davidson's conviction to warrant admission of the
conviction under the rule.

In light of the clear admissibility

of both convictions under Rule 609, any inquiry concerning the
details of the convictions would be misleading, wasteful, and
cumulative.

Because evidence that goes to general disposition or

is unfairly prejudicial is not admissible, this Court should
uphold the trial court's refusal to admit the convictions under
-7-

Rule 404(b).
Finally, defendant waived consideration by this Court
of the admissibility of hearsay testimony of defense witness,
Scott E. Montoya, when he failed to make a proffer of the
substantive content of the hearsay testimony or to provide the
court with an express exception to the general rule prohibiting
the admission of hearsay evidence when asked to do so by the
trial court.

Thus, on remand for new trial this Court should

affirm the trial court's ruling insofar as it rests on the above
grounds.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO INQUIRE AS TO A KEY PROSECUTION
WITNESS'S PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE
609 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR; HOWEVER, THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO INQUIRE
CONCERNING THE CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 4 04 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE WAS PROPER.
Prior to the trial testimony of key prosecution
witness, Scott T. Davidson, the trial court reversed its earlier
ruling allowing defense counsel to inquire concerning Davidson's
felony theft convictions under Rules 404 and 609 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence (T. at 44-47; See Addendum A ) .

After further

reflection on the matter, the trial court informed defense
counsel that he had erroneously applied Rule 404 to the question
of the admissibility of Davidson's felony theft convictions and
that he would no longer permit defense counsel to inquire about
Davidson's convictions for the improper purpose of "proving
-8-

conformity" (T. at 45-46).

Specifically, the trial court stated,

"My ruling is changed in that you cannot inquire concerning the
burglary incident for the purpose of showing that he's a leader"
(T. at 46).
As for Rule 609, the trial court noted the propriety of
its application to the question of the admissibility of
Davidson's felony convictions and informed defense counsel that
"if [Davidson's] answers are sufficient that you can challenge
his credibility because he testified falsely on credibility,
absolutely you can go after him on credibility" (T. at 46).
However, the court further advised defense counsel that because
he had
heard nothing from [Davidson's] testimony
that would indicate that that burglary was of
such a nature that it involved false
statements indicating that his testimonial
character is subject to challenge. And
therefore, [he] [had] nothing in front of
[him] right [then] to indicate that it would
be appropriate for [defense counsel] to bring
out his conviction on the burglary on the
theft.
(T. at 47).

Thus, apparently, the trial court would allow

inquiry concerning Davidson's prior felony theft convictions only
if Davidson testified falsely concerning his involvement in the
present case (T. at 46-47).

The trial court's ruling reflects

the belief that the protections afforded defendants under Rule
609 apply equally to prosecution witnesses.

However, a review of

the express language of Rule 609, the advisory committee note
thereto, and interpretative case law, suggests that the trial
court's application of Rule 609 to the facts of this case was
-9-

erroneous and that defense counsel should have been permitted to
inquire concerning Davidson's prior felony convictions at trial,
regardless of whether Davidson testified falsely concerning his
involvement,
A,

The trial court's application of Rule 609 to
evidence of Davidson's prior felony
convictions was erroneous.

Rule 609 provides in part that the credibility of a
witness may be attacked by evidence that he has been convicted of
a felony, "and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant."

Utah R. Evid. 609(a) (emphasis added).'6

The

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 609 reiterates the above concern,
noting that the Utah rule is the same as the federal rule in
granting the court "discretion in convictions not involving
dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if
it would be prejudicial to the defendant" (emphasis added).
advisory committee further notes that "[c]urrent Utah law

Specifically. Rule 609(a) provides:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
-10-

The

mandates the admission of such evidence."7
Similarly, federal case law8 interpreting Rule 609 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, supports the view that all felony
convictions are probative of credibility to some degree.

United

States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1056-1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Moreover, to the extent that a particular witness's felony
conviction is only slightly probative of credibility, only the
prejudicial effect to the defendant is to be weighed against
probative valueomitted).

Ld. at 1508 n.37, 1061 n.49 (citations

This view is consistent with "'Congress' understanding

that 'the prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness may
always be used [because] [t]here can be no prejudicial effect to
the defendant.'"

JA. at 1058 n. 37 (citations omitted).

For

witnesses other than the accused "'the danger of prejudice . . .
[is] outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much
relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible.'"

Id.

at 1061; United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (quoting a Conference Committee member who told the
House that "now a defendant can cross examine a government

7

See Boyce & Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 Part-II,
1987 Utah L. Rev. 467, 492 n.127, 494 n.141 497 (noting that
discretion should rarely be used to limit impeachment in a civil
case or of a prosecution witness).
8

In State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), this Court recognized that because the Utah and federal
rules are identical, Utah appellate courts look to federal cases
in interpreting Rule 609. E.g. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 654
(Utah 1989); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986);
State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
-11-

witness about any of his previous felony convictions; he can
always do it, because that will not prejudice him in anyway
[sic], • • . Only the Government is going to be limited*
120 Cong, Rec. H. 12,257),

..."

See United States v. Thome, 547 F.2d

56 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).

See also Campbell

v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the only
witness who may demand a balancing of the prejudicial value of
his criminal record against its probative effect is the defendant
in a criminal trial).9
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has
similarly interpreted Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Green v. Rock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-511, 109
S.Ct. 1981, 1984-85, 1991-92 (1989).

The Green Court considered

Rule 609 's application in a civil case and determined that trial
courts must admit evidence of prior felony convictions to impeach
a witness in a civil case "regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice
to the witness or the party offering the testimony."
1993.

JId. at

In so holding, the Court observed that "Rule 609(a)(l)'s

9

Cf.. United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.
1981). Relying on language in Smith, 551 F.2d at 360, and noting
the that the burden of establishing the admissibility of a prior
conviction rests on the proponent, Cunningham appears to assert
that the admission of such evidence against a prosecution witness
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Ld. at 697-98.
However, Cunningham ignores additional explanatory language in
Smith that impeachment by prior convictions is regulated only
where the defendant's interests might be prejudiced, "and not
where the prosecution might suffer, or where a non-defendant
witness complains of possible loss of reputation in the
community." Smith, 551 F.2d at 359 n.21.
-12-

textual limitation of the prejudice balance to criminal
defendants resulted from deliberation not oversight; . . .
[therefore, the conferees] intended that only the accused in a
criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the
balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)."

JEd. at 1991.

See 3

Weinstein's Evidence, 609[06], at 609-109 (Supp. 1991).10
Based on the foregoing analysis, the State concedes
that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to
inquire concerning Davidson's felony convictions under Rule 609;
moreover, because Davidson was a critical prosecution witness,
whose testimony was the only evidence directly contradicting
defendant's testimony concerning the requisite element of intent,
there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the
outcome would have been more favorable for defendant.
10

State v.

Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence was recently
amended, effective December 1, 1990, to provide for application
of the "general balancing test of Rule 403 to protect all
litigants against unfair impeachment of witnesses." JEd. at 5
(Spec. Alert 1990):
General rule. - For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an
accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the
crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment, in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted,
and evidence that an accused has been
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted
if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
-13-

Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Verde, 770
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).

Thus, this case should be remanded

for a new trial with direction to the trial court that Davidson's
felony convictions are admissible for impeachment purposes under
Rule 609.

However, contrary to defendant's apparcmt assertion,

the scope of his inquiry concerning Davidson's felony convictions
must be limited to "the nature of the crime, the date of the
conviction and the punishment."

State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819,

822 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that prior convictions solicited
under Rule 609(a) are considered only for impeachment purposes).
B.

Defendant's inquiry on remand is properly
limited solely to Rule 609 impeachment
purposes and he may not inquire into
Davidson's prior felony convictions under
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Defendant asserts that the trial court's refusal to
allow defense counsel to inquire concerning Davidson's felony
convictions under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence was
error because Davidson's "felony theft conviction concerning the
camper shells . . . [demonstrates] that in following the plans of
others in that criminal enterprise, [] Davidson [] learned how to
plan a crime to be committed by others."

Defendant further

asserts that defense counsel was attempting to show Davidson's
"knowledge," and not his "conformity" with past conduct (Br. of
App. at 18). Although Rule 404(b) provides for the admission of
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" of a person to
establish "knowledge," it expressly prohibits the admission of
such evidence "to prove the character of a person in order to
-14-

show . . • . [action] in conformity therewith."11

Because

defendant has not sufficiently established that Davidson's felony
conviction for theft of a camper shell goes to his "knowledge" in
the present case, or serves any other proper purpose under Rule
404(b), his argument concerning the admissibility of Davidson's
felony conviction under the rule is without merit.
Defendant appears to assert that evidence concerning
the details of Davidson's theft of a camper shell is admissible
under Rule 404(b) because the details of that theft are arguably
similar to the details of the instant theft and thus demonstrate
that Davidson could have planned the theft of the hot tub (Br. of
App. 18). 12
11

However, defendant offers only general allegations

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

12

In support of his argument, defendant further asserts
that several federal courts apply a relaxed standard to evidence
sought to be admitted by defendants under Rule 404(b), Federal
Rules of Evidence. United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 776
(11th Cir. 1990) (standard for admission of bad conduct evidence
is relaxed when offered by defendant); United States v.
Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2nd Cir. 1984) (standard of
admission need not be as restrictive when defendant offers
similar acts evidence).
Admittedly, the Utah rule is based on
the federal version of Rule 404(b) and, therefore, federal case
law interpreting that rule is persuasive here. However, unlike
Rule 609, Rule 404(b) does not contain express language limiting
concerns about possible prejudicial effect to the defendant only.
Also, the Utah appellate courts have not expressly stated a clear
intention to follow federal case law in interpreting the Utah
-15-

that Davidson knew how to ask other people to steal for him (Br.
of App. at 18). There is no specific evidence of how that may
have occurred in this case, nor evidence that identical tactics
were employed.

United States v. Rodriguez, 917 F.2d 1286, 1289

(11th Cir. 1990).
426 (Utah 1989).

See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,
Moreover, while defendant claims to have been

duped into stealing the hot tub, Davidson at no time alleged that
he was duped into stealing the camper shell (J.S. at 74-75; See
Addendum B).

Absent such specificity and similarity, defendant

has not established that the manner in which these two entirely
separate and unrelated crimes were committed is admissible to
show Davidson's knowledge of the instant theft under Rule 404(b).
Rodriguez, 917 F.2d at 1289 (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding evidence sought to be admitted under Rule
404(b) which constituted nothing more than general allegation
entirely lacking in specificity).

version of Rule 404(b).
Furthermore, although several federal courts may apply
a relaxed standard regarding the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence against a prosecution witness, the evidence must still
meet the general balancing test of Rule 403, Federal Rules of
Evidence. Cohen, 888 F.2d at 776 (where proffered evidence is
shown to have a special relevance to a disputed issue, trial
court must still balance the probative value against the
possibility of unfair prejudice); Aboumoussa11em, 726 F.2d at 912
(in upholding trial court's refusal to admit evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(b), court noted that relevant evidence
may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative value is
substantially outweighed). In any event, defendant's analysis is
simply insufficient to demonstrate that admission of Davidson's
previous involvement in the theft of a camper shell is either
relevant or admissible, even under a relaxed standard of
admissibility.
-16-

Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that
evidence will not be admitted under Rule 404(b)
merely because it shows a common plan,
scheme, or manner of operation. Instead,
evidence of a common plan, scheme, or manner
of operation is admitted where it tends to
prove some fact material to the crime
charged.
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 426, Although Featherson dealt with the
usual situation where the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence
of the accused's conduct on another occasion, defendant has not
established that proof of Davidson's prior theft of a camper
shell tends to either prove or, in this case, disprove "some fact
material to the crime charged."

Moreover, the admissibility of

"prior bad act evidence" under Utah's Rule 404(b), like its
federal counterpart, is subject to the general balancing test of
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.13 Id; State v. Gotschall, 782
P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989) (noting that Rule 4 04(b) does not end
the analysis because evidence otherwise admissible under the rule
is still subject to exclusion under Rule 403 which provides the
trial court discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence
when its potential for unfair prejudice outweighs its
probativeness).

13

Thus, even assuming that the mere fact of

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
-17-

Davidson's theft of the camper shell is sufficient under a
relaxed standard to establish evidence of a "common plan, scheme,
or manner of operation" in the present case, the evidence was
properly excluded under Rule 403.

Defendant simply has not and

can not demonstrate sufficient similarity between the two crimes
to establish Davidson's knowledge as to the theft in the present
case.

Because "[e]vidence that goes to general disposition or is

unfairly prejudicial is not admissible," this Court should uphold
the trial court's refusal to admit evidence concerning the
details of Davidson's felony theft conviction under Rule 404(b).
Id. at 427.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE WITNESS
AND DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF THE
ISSUE BY FAILING TO PROPERLY PRESERVE IT IN
THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendant appears to assert that the trial court erred
in refusing to allow defense witness, Scott E. Montoya, to
testify concerning his recollection of a conversation he
allegedly overheard between defendant and Davidson at the time
the hot tub was delivered to Davidson's home (Br. of App. at 19).
He asserts that because the testimony arguably would have
impeached Davidson's credibility it was admissible under State v.
Hutchinson, 655 P,2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982).

However, contrary to

defendant's assertion, the trial court never made a final ruling
on the admissibility of Montoya's testimony; rather, the court
asked defense counsel to provide him with an exception to the
-18-

general prohibition against the admission of hearsay testimony1*
(T. at 103; See Addendum C).

Although defense counsel argued

generally that the evidence would go to Davidson's credibility,
he informed the court that he did not know the content of
Montoya's testimony and was thus unable to direct the court to a
specific exception (T. at 103).
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in pertinent
part that
[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and . . . . [i]n case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer
or was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked.
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2).

In light of defendant's failure to make

known to the trial court the "substance" of Montoya's testimony
concerning the he conversation he allegedly overheard between
Davidson and defendant, it can not reasonably be argued that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit the testimony.

State v.

Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986) (an erroneous exclusion of
evidence will not be set aside unless a proffer of evidence
appears of record, and the excluded evidence would probably have
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different
verdict).

See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 578

P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978); Bradley v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d
1A

See Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence which provides:
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by law or by these rules.
-19-

1240, 1243 (Utah 1980).

Moreover, by failing to make a proffer

of the substantive content of Montoya's testimony or to provide
the court with an express exception to Rule 802 when asked by the
trial court, defendant has waived his right to claim error.
Thus, on remand for a new trial, this Court should affirm the
trial court's ruling insofar as it rests on the above grounds.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should
remand this case for new trial with direction to the trial court
that Davidson's prior felony convictions are admissible solely
for impeachment purposes under Rule 609; thus, this Court should
affirm the trial court's refusal to allow inquiry concerning the
details of Davidson's felony theft convictions under Rule 404(b).
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
excluding the hearsay testimony of Montoya because defendant
failed to properly preserve the issue for review by this Court.
Respectfully submitted thisczL)-. ^ a Y °f

Ma

Y / 1991.
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Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

THE COURT:

I looked over the rules, and it

2

appears to me if you want character evidence, we're talking

3

about the character of Mr. Davidson.

4

in certain ways.

5

of his character with a particular incident on the date

6

in question.

7

It's got to come in

And the disclaimed way is proving conformity

I don't think you can do it.

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, all I can do is say that -

8

and I believe this to be a sound statement of the law —

9

if you call somebody as a witness, you vouch for their

10

credibility, that it follows that someone who is a convicted

1!

felon or at least assignment of responsibility is his, that

12

someone who has been convicted of a felony is less credible.

13

And I think that is the rule, and that is you're entitled

14

to inquire of someone who is a witness offered by the

15

government.

16

THE COURT:

But when the government and the

17

Supreme Court have ruled on these cases, they have ruled

18

under Rule 609.

19

they have addressed that very thing on credibility with

20

respect to a defendant, and have addressed it only in context]

21

of credibility and not in the context of Rule 404, prejudice

22

They have not ruled under Rule 404, and

if they had addressed it in the context of

23

Rule 404, then I would say that there may be a different

24

standard applicable to known defendant witnesses, because

25

they have said the conviction of a crime does not reflect
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1

generally upon credibility.

2

MR. VAN SCIVER:

If what I have interpreted,

3

and I thought this was your ruling, Crime No. 1 in f85 is

4

out, you couldn't inquire because it wasn't anything the

5

finder of fact could determine from that and it would address!

6

itself to just trying to discredit him.

7

one, particularly if he contends that it's Smith's idea,

8

can be inquired into.

9

THE COURT:

But that the other

That was my original ruling.

What

10

I'm saying now, and that ruling was independent of credibility

11

it was really directed to character.

12
13

MR. VAN SCIVER:

I think not.

The latter, you

almost have to wait and see what his answers are.

14

THE COURT:

Well, if his answers are sufficient

15

that you can challenge his credibility because he testified

16

falsely on credibility, absolutely you can go after him on

17

credibility.

18

propensity to be a leader in ill-gotten goods, because that

19

was character evidence.

But I don't think you can inquire about his

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

21

THE'COURT:

All right.

My ruling is changed in that you

22

cannot inquire concerning the burglary incident for the

23

purpose of showing that he's a leader.

24
25

MR. VAN SCIVER:
fine.

Well, I just, you know, that's

If we leave out the word leader, I don't know where

46

1

we'll go, and all I'm saying to you, thanks for the direction],

2

but I think maybe it's a little premature to decide where

3

I need to stop.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. VAN SCIVER:

6

Well

—
I'm not going to go over the

line.

7

THE COURT:

I'm saying you're not going to be

8

able to get into the proposition on the burglary that he's

9

a leader, that leaves only the possibility of credibility.

JO

And I heard nothing from his testimony that would indicate

11

that that burglary was of such a nature that it involved

12

false statements indicating that his testimonial character

13

is subject to challenge.

14

in front of me right now to indicate that it would be appropriate

15

for you to bring out his conviction on the burglary on the

16

theft.

And, therefore, I have nothing

17

MR. VAN SCIVER:

18

THE COURT:

19

the

All right.

Okay.
So we're left only with

—

20

MR. VAN SCIVER:

21

THE COURT:

22

Okay.

False driver's license.

Right.

And whether or not —

how

his deal in this case reflects upon his credibility.

23

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Right.

All right.

24

THE COURT:

25

[Whereupon, court was in recess at 2:50 p.m.]

We'll take a short recess.
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1

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

2

MR. SKORDAS:

Scott Davidson.

3
4

SCOTT DAVIDSON,

5

called as a witness by the State of Utah, having been duly

6

sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as follows:

7
8
9
10

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SKORDAS:
You realize you1 re still under oath.

ft

11

Scott, would you state your full name, please.

12
13

A.
ft

14
15

17

ft

ft

21
22
23
24
25

Weber Brothers.
Weber

A.
ft

20

D-a-v-i-d-s-o-n.
Where do you work?

A.

18
19

Spell your last.
A.

16

Scott T. Davidson.

Brothers?

Yes.
What kind of business is that?

A.
ft

Plastering company.
Did you work there in August of this year?

A.
ft
A.
ft

Yes, I did.
Are you familiar with the defendant here?
Yes.
How do you know him?
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ADDENDUM B

Q.

And was that ever revoked?

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

Because of a theft.

Q.

Another theft?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You made a bunch of implicit promises in the

Over a carpenter shop.

probation agreement which you signed in writing.
A.

Yes.

10 I

Q.

And I suppose, by your actions, you lied?

H

A.

No, I just didn't live up to the agreement that

12

I had.

13 I
14

Yes, basically, probation agreement.

Q.

When you signed it, you committed the next

felony in that you promised not to violate the law?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Technically, I guess.

18 I

So by your actions, you lied.

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Well, your Honor, I don't see

19

where a violation of probation is a crime involving

20

dishonesty.

21

to get any better than that sort of fabrication.

22
23
24

I don't know that in either case it's going

Q*

Run us quickly through the facts in number

A.

I got involved with some people that were

two.

25 I taking camper shells, and I got involved with them and I
74

1

took one myself with them.

2
3

Q.

1

Were there some parallels in that one and in

this one?

|

4

A.

I don't understand what you mean.

5

Q.

Who planned the taking of those?

6

A.

Another guy did.

7

Q.

What role did you play?

8

A.

Mainly labor.

9

Q.

What?

10

A.

Just labor.

11

Q.

You got caught with the camper shell?

12

A.

Yes.
THE COURT:

13
14

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:
the

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

25

Then they gave you a grocery list

and you were to go there and get it?
THE WITNESS:

23

24

This place would have what they

wanted.

21
22

They gave you the information as to

—

19
20

Well, the other guys gave me the

information on it, and the rest of it was up to me.

17
18

Who

planned the burglary?

15
16

What about the burglary?

1

Q.

Yes.

(By Mr. Van Sciver)

In terms of setting the

time, determining when you were going to do it, who
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ADDENDUM C

1
2

ft

you can recall?

3
4

And were there any markings on that tub that

A.
all.

There was a tag on it, a sold tag.

That was

Other than just the hot tub itself.

5

Q.

Did you see any signs of any kind on the fence?

6 1

k

No.

1

Q.

There wasn't anything on the fence?

ft

All right.

Where did you go from there?

9 1

A.

We drove out to the street which was — the

10

south I'm not sure, then headed east toward State Street

11

and got to State Street and headed north towards Murray

12

High School.

13
14

ft
k

All right.

What was to be your destination?

We had to stop and make a phone call because

15

Rodney didn't have the address to Scott's house.

16

met us behind Murray High School and we followed him to

17

his house from there.

18

ft

19

house?

20 I

k

What occurred when you got to Mr. Davidson's

I backed the truck to the side of his house

21

and we unloaded it, and that was it.

22

of his house, you know, behind the house.

23
24
25

ft

So he

Put it in the back

Were you present during any conversations between

Mr. Smith and Mr. Davidson?
k

I was there the whole time, yes.

101

1

Q.

What was discussed between you?

2 J

A.

The only conversation —

*

MR. SKORDAS:

I object.

*

MR. VAN SCIVER:

That was hearsay.

Well, I suppose it could be

5

an exception to hearsay, at least as to credibility, because

^

it would be offered,

'

both declarants.

arguably, against the interest of

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. VAN SCIVER: *es.

10
11

MR. SKORDAS: Well, it's not going to come out
that way.

12
13

Going on what was said?

THE COURT:

All right.

Credibility is not an

exception to the hearsay rule.

14

MR. VAN SCIVER:

No, but being offered against —

15

Q.

Was there a conversation that you overheard?

1*

k

Yes.

17

Q,

All right.

18

Did you see anything exchange hands

between the two gentlemen?

19

A.

No.

20

QL

When did you leave Mr. Davidson's premises?

21

A.

I don't know the exact time. We were probably

22
23
24
25

there maybe 15 minutes.
Q

And, again, the time that you arrived at the

yard where the tub was was when?
k

1 would say about quarter to 6:00.

In that
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1
2

neighborhood.
And when you arrived at Mr. Davidsonfs house?

ft
k

3

Maybe five after 6:00.

4
5

MR. VAN SCIVER:

What's the ruling on this

conversation?

6

THE COURT:

Well, I don't see how it fits into

7

one of the exceptions for the availability of the declarants

8

I mean/ maybe you can help me.

9

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Maybe it is

—

Well, I don't know what the

10

conversation was, but I guess it can be offered to rebut

11

what Mr. Davidson claimed the conversation was.

12

inappropriate that he can testify what it was and not

13

Mr. Montoya.

14
15

THE COURT:

MR. VAN SCIVER:

Q.

22

k
ft

25

Not a long period of time, no.
Were you ever segregated from Mr. Smith and

Mr. Davidson in any way?
k

23
24

Was there a conversation of any length that

you can recall?

20
21

I don't know what the

conversation was.

18
19

I need you

to inform me of an exception.

16
17

Well, I need to be —

Seems

ft

No.
And you saw nothing exchange hands?

k

Nothing.
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1
2

Q,

Now, on the ride back was there any talk between

you and Mr. Smith about money?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

What did you do that weekend?

5

K

Sat at his house.

6
7
8

ft

Why?
A.

We were both broke, didn't have no money to

go nowhere.

9

$

When was your pay day?

10

k

That following Wednesday.

11

MR. VAN SCIVER:

12

THE COURT:

That's all.

Mr. Skordas?

13
14
15
16 I

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SKORDAS:
ft

Mr. Montoya, do you remember talking with

17

Det. Hodgkinson from the Midvale City Police about this

18

matter?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Do you recall when that conversation took place?

21

A.

I believe it was the following Tuesday or Wednesday,

22
23 I
24
25

I'm not quite sure.
Q.

If I told you that I had a report in my hand

from Det. Hodgkinson that was dated August 24th —
A.

That's probably right.
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